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Chapter Nine
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Robert D. Sloane*

A. Introduction
Between April 6, 1994, when an unknown agent shot down the plane carrying
Rwanda’s former President Juvenal Habyarimana, and early July 1994, when
the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) commanded by General Paul Kagame,
now Rwanda’s president, consolidated its hold on power, the “Hutu Power”
movement, Interahamwe, and interim government of Rwanda systematically
raped, maimed, and massacred somewhere between 500,000 and 800,000
Tutsi and moderate Hutu.1 It was “the most unambiguous case of genocide
since the [Holocaust].”2 Throughout the genocide, the United Nations did
little except to extend and adjust the mandate of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), which had been established the previous year
to monitor implementation of the Arusha Accords of August 4, 1993,3 and
(belatedly) to impose a general arms embargo on Rwanda.4 Only the military success of the RPF put an end to the genocide.5 Kofi Annan, who had

* The author acknowledges with gratitude the excellent research assistance of Elizabeth
Grosso, Harvard Law School, J.D. expected 2013.
1
See Alison Des Forges, “Leave None to Tell the Story”: Genocide in Rwanda (New York:
Human Rights Watch, 1999), pp. 1, 6, 15–16; I. Carlsson, “The UN Inadequacies,” 4 J. Int’l
Crim. Just. 837 (2005), p. 841.
2
Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will be Killed with our
Families (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 1999), p. 170.
3
See des Forges, “Leave None to Tell the Story,” op. cit., pp. 123–25; see, e.g., S.C. Res. 918,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (May 17, 1994).
4
S.C. Res. 918, U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (May 17, 1994); see generally Roméo Dallaire, Shake
Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (New York: Carroll & Graf
Publishers, 2003).
5
Des Forges, “Leave None to Tell the Story,” op. cit., p. 13.
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been Chief of Peacekeeping Operations at the time and served as SecretaryGeneral from 1997 to 2006, acknowledged both that he personally “could
have done more” and that the international community bore guilt for “sins
of omission.”6

B. Establishment of the ICTR7
On July 1, 1994, in the midst of the genocide’s final days, the U.N. Security Council asked the Secretary-General to establish an expert commission
to investigate the numerous reports of systematic, widespread violations
of international human rights and humanitarian law in Rwanda.8 On
November 8, 1994, the Security Council, stressing the commission’s findings and other credible evidence, and “convinced that in the particular
circumstances of Rwanda, the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of humanitarian law would . . . contribute to the process of
national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace,”
passed Resolution 955, establishing the ICTR to prosecute “persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the territory of Rwanda . . . between 1 January 1994 and 31
December 1994.”9 The Council annexed the ICTR’s statute to this resolution,
defining the scope of its jurisdiction and the Tribunal’s general structure.10
By establishing the ICTR – like the institutionally-related ad hoc international criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which had been
created about eighteen months earlier11 – through an exercise of its Chapter VII powers, the Security Council effectively required all U.N. member
States to cooperate with the ICTR.12 Based on considerations of efficiency,
safety, justice, economy, and fairness, the Council later decided to establish the Court’s seat in Arusha, Tanzania, rather than Kigali or elsewhere in

6
7
8
9
10

11
12

“UN Chief ’s Rwanda Genocide Regret,” BBC News, Mar. 26, 2004.
The website of the Tribunal is: http://www.unictr.org/.
S.C. Res. 935, U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (July 1, 1994).
S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed
in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other
Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, Between Jan. 1, 1994
and Dec. 31, 1994. S.C. Res. 955, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (hereinafter ICTR
Statute).
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
See U.N. Charter Arts. 25, 39, 41, 48–49.
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Rwanda.13 This may well have been prudent and appropriate for the reasons stated by the Council. But it has led to a relatively widespread, negative perception among Rwandans, many of whom see the ICTR as remote,
foreign, and insufficiently responsive to the interests of the victims. Contributing to this perception, the ICTR decided from the outset to focus its
limited resources on the major architects of the genocide rather than the
literally thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of rank-and-file perpetrators. The latter would be tried by Rwanda’s national courts or, as matters
developed, by the traditional Rwandan dispute-resolution process known as
gacaca.14 Because the ICTR’s statute, consistent with contemporary international human rights standards, does not authorize the death penalty, many
perceived a “perverse disparity” in the fact that
the elites who orchestrated the genocide [would] escape a potential death sentence and . . . serve their sentences in facilities that conform to modern international human rights standards, while the (presumably less culpable) rank and
file [would] languish for years in overcrowded jails, awaiting trial in Rwanda’s
severely backlogged national system – only to then face death or imprisonment
in Rwandan prisons that fall far short of those standards.15

In fact, Rwanda, which coincidentally held one of the rotating, nonpermanent seats on the Security Council at the time, voted against the ICTR’s
creation in large part because, unlike Rwanda’s national courts, the ICTR
would not be authorized to impose the death penalty.16

C. Organization of the ICTR
The ICTR, like the ICTY, consists of three organs: (1) the Chambers, (2) the
Office of the Prosecutor, and (3) the Registry.17
13

14

15

16

17

S.C. Res. 977, U.N. Doc. S/RES/977 (Feb. 22, 1995); see also S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
See William A. Schabas, “Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts,” 3 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 87
(2005).
Robert D. Sloane, “Sentencing for the ‘Crime of Crimes’: The Evolving ‘Common Law’
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,” 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 713 (2007),
pp. 719–20; see also William A. Schabas, “Sentencing By International Tribunals: A Human
Rights Approach,” 7 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 461 (1997), p. 508; Madeline Morris, “The
Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda,” 7 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 349
(1997), p. 364; see generally Jens David Ohlin, “Applying the Death Penalty to Crimes of
Genocide,” 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 747 (2005).
Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law (William A. Schabas & Nadia Bernaz
eds., New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 58.
ICTR Statute Art. 10.
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1. Chambers
The ICTR has three Trial Chambers. Each consists of a presiding judge and
two other judges.18 The General Assembly elects the judges for four-year
renewable terms.19 It elected the ICTR’s first judges on May 25, 1995.20 While
the Tribunal initially consisted of two Trial Chambers and six judges, the
size of its docket led the Security Council to add an additional Trial Chamber in 1998. Today, the ICTR has nine permanent judges. Eighteen ad litem
judges, authorized by the Security Council in 2003,21 assist the nine permanent judges. Unlike their elected brethren, the ad litem judges are appointed
by the Secretary-General. In the interest of a consistent jurisprudence, the
ICTR shares its Appeals Chamber, which sits in The Hague, with the ICTY.
Trial Chambers, in contrast, sit at the Tribunal’s official seat in Arusha,
Tanzania.22
2. The Office of the Prosecutor
The Office of the Prosecutor bears responsibility for investigating allegations,
charging the defendants, and prosecuting them to verdict and, if necessary,
on appeal. Indictments must be confirmed by one of the Trial Chamber
judges based on a judicial finding that the Prosecutor has made out “a prima
facie case.”23 Initially, the ICTR and the ICTY shared not only an Appeals
Chamber, but a Prosecutor, in the interest of a common prosecutorial policy
among the two ad hoc Tribunals. But based on both the ICTR’s docket and a
perception “that the ICTR was the ‘poor cousin’ of the ICTY,”24 the Security
Council modified this state of affairs in 2003, and the ICTR now has its own
full-time designated Prosecutor.25
3. The Registry
The Registrar is appointed for a four-year, renewable term by the SecretaryGeneral in consultation with the ICTR’s President.26 The Registry’s staff

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25
26

ICTR Statute Art. 11(a).
ICTR Statute Art. 12.
See G.A. Res. 51/399, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/399 (Sep. 24, 1996).
S.C. Res. 1431, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1431 (2002).
ICTR Statute Art. 12(2).
ICTR Statute Art. 18.
Robert Cryer, et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 113.
S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003).
ICTR Statute Art. 16.
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provide administrative support to the other two organs,27 including, for
example, protection of witnesses, “administration of the free legal aid system,
and the management of the UN Detention facility in Arusha.”28 The Registry
also serves as a liaison to the press.

D. Jurisdiction
The ICTR has subject matter jurisdiction (jurisdiction ratione materiae) over
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, which, in the context of
the Rwandan genocide and related civil war, include only violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 or of Additional Protocol
II of 1977.29 Rwanda is a party to both treaties. The ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction (jurisdiction ratione temporis), as set forth in Resolution 955, covers
only the one-year period in which the genocide took place, that is, crimes
within the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICTR perpetrated between January 1, 1994, and December 31, 1994.30 The Tribunal’s personal jurisdiction
(jurisdiction ratione personae), finally, extends to any person who allegedly
committed one of the statutorily enumerated crimes in Rwanda, as well as
to all Rwandan citizens who allegedly committed such crimes in the territory
of neighbouring States, in 1994.31 The ICTR enjoys primacy in relation to
national court proceedings, meaning that while it exercises concurrent jurisdiction with national courts, given the prohibition on double jeopardy, or ne
bis in idem, as that principle is known in international law,32 the ICTR may
“[a]t any stage of the procedure . . . formally request national courts to defer
to its competence.”33 Because the Security Council established the ICTR pursuant to its Chapter VII powers, member States are legally obliged to comply
with any such request.

27

28

29

30
31
32
33

Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, op. cit., pp.
104, 113.
The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Antonio Cassese ed.) (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 355.
See, e.g., Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War Art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (hereinafter Common Article 3); and Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (hereinafter Additional Protocol II).
S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
Id. Art. 1.
Id. Art. 9.
Id. Art. 8.
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In relation to the enumerated crimes set forth in Articles 2 through 4 of
the Statute, viz., genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, individual criminal responsibility under international law may be incurred by any
defendant who “planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise aided
and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime.”34 Article
6 also (1) vitiates any head of State or other immunity that might otherwise
attach under customary international law to particular governmental officials; (2) provides for superior (command) responsibility based on a finding
that the defendant “knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was
about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
perpetrators thereof ”; and (3) makes clear that a subordinate’s plea that he
“acted pursuant to an order of . . . a superior shall not relieve him of criminal
responsibility,” though it may be taken into account at sentencing.35

E. Procedural Overview
Article 14 of the ICTR Statute provides that “[t]he judges of the [ICTR] shall
adopt . . . the rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct” of all phases of
the trial proceedings, up to and including appeals. Pursuant to that authority,
in 1995, the ICTR adopted Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE), which it
has amended periodically.36 The Statute, as augmented by both the RPE and
procedural case law, establishes the contours of the ICTR’s trial process.
Proceedings begin when the Prosecutor decides to investigate allegations
received from any of a variety of sources, including governments, intergovernmental organizations, U.N. organs, and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs).37 The Prosecutor’s staff may question witnesses, victims, and suspects, collect evidence, and seek documentary evidence or other assistance
from States.38 During the investigation, suspects enjoy the right to counsel.39
If the Prosecutor finds a “sufficient basis to proceed,” then he prepares an
indictment concisely stating the facts and allegations, which he transmits
to the Trial Chamber for confirmation.40 Once the indictment has been

34
35
36

37
38
39
40

Id. Art. 6(1).
Id. Art. 6(3).
Id. Art. 14; see also Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, op. cit., pp. 355,
495–97.
ICTR Statute Art. 17(1).
Id. Art. 17(2).
Id. Art. 17(3); see also RPE Rule 42.
ICTR Statute Art. 17(4).
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confirmed (and assuming custody of the accused), the formal trial process
begins. Articles 19 and 20 of the ICTR Statute guarantee fundamental due
process rights to accused persons, including the right to a “fair and expeditious” trial, to be informed of the nature of the charges, and to equality
before the law.41 The ICTR Statute also provides that the any hearings “shall
be public,” subject to exceptions for good cause as set forth in the RPE.
Under the RPE, the accused enjoys the right to use his or her own language, though the official languages of the Tribunal are French and English.42
Once transferred to the Tribunal’s custody, the accused must be brought
before the Trial Chamber “without delay” to be charged formally, and at
that time, he will be asked to plead guilty or not guilty to each charge in the
indictment. In the former case, the Trial Chamber must satisfy itself that the
plea of the accused is “informed,” “voluntary,” and “unequivocal,” as well as
supported by “sufficient facts [establishing] the crime and the participation
of the accused in it.”43 At all times, the accused enjoys the right to be represented by counsel.
If the accused pleads not guilty, the trial process, based on a mixed adversarial-inquisitorial model, continues to a discovery phase. The Prosecutor
must disclose the existence of exculpatory evidence “as soon as practicable,”44
while the defense must notify the Prosecutor of any intent to rely on an
alibi or other special defense, including “diminished or lack of mental
responsibility.”45 Defense counsel also has a reciprocal disclosure obligation
to make available to the Prosecutor “any books, documents, photographs” or
other evidence that it intends to introduce at trial. Each party must apprise
the other if new evidence or information emerges.46
At the request of either party or proprio motu, a judge or the Trial Chamber
may issue any orders, such as subpoenas, summonses, warrants, and transfer
orders, which may be required for the conduct of the trial. The RPE set forth
a variety of preliminary, in limine, and other pretrial motions that may be
made, including objections to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction or alleged defects
in the indictment, and applications for severance in the event of joined proceedings.47 Pretrial motions will be heard and decided by a judge of the Trial

41
42
43
44
45
46
47

See ICTR Statute Arts. 19–20.
RPE Rule 3.
Id. Rule 62.
Id. Rule 68; see also id. Rule 67(A)(i).
Id. Rule 67(A)(ii).
Id. Rule 67.
See id. Rule 72.

261-282_Giorgetti_F11.indd 267

11/22/2011 5:31:29 PM

268

Robert D. Sloane

Chamber; there is no right to an interlocutory appeal from decisions on such
motions.48
The Trial Chamber “shall” hold a pretrial conference before trial begins, at
which it (or one of its judges) may request, inter alia, a pretrial brief, admissions or a statement of other undisputed matters, a list of the witnesses the
Prosecutor intends to call, a summary of the facts to which those witnesses
will testify, and a list of exhibits.49 The Trial Chamber also “may” hold a
comparable conference before the defense presents its case.50 Rule 74 vests
the Trial Chambers with discretion to receive and consider submissions from
amicus curiae.51 Proceedings, in general, will be held in public, except as
required for “public order or morality,” “[s]afety, security, or non-disclosure
of the identity of a victim or witness,” or under the catch-all rubric of “protection of the interests of justice.”52
The trial proceedings generally follow the model of an adversarial criminal trial. After opening statements, each party presents its case (unless the
defense chooses to decline to put on an affirmative defense), putting on evidence and examining witnesses in the order specified by the RPE.53 Each
witness is subject to examination, cross-examination, and re-examination, as
well as to judicial questioning,54 after which the parties present their closing
arguments.55
The Trial Chamber deliberates in private, and a conviction requires that a
majority of the three judges be “satisfied that guilt has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.”56 While the RPE initially provided for a distinct sentencing phase, it “abandoned sentencing hearings early in its existence based
on considerations of expedience and cost.”57 Today, a conviction must be
accompanied by the determination of sentence as to each count,58 while in
the event of acquittal, the accused must be released forthwith.59 The Tribunal’s judgments “shall be pronounced in public,” accompanied, if applicable,
by “[s]eparate or dissenting opinions.”60

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id. Rule 73(B).
Id. Rule 73bis.
Id. Rule 73ter.
Id. Rule 74.
Id. Rule 79.
Id. Rule 85.
Id. Rule 85(B).
Id. Rule 86.
Id. Rule 87.
Sloane, “Sentencing for the ‘Crime of Crimes,’ ” op. cit., p. 734.
RPE Rule 87.
Id. Rule 99.
Id. Rule 88.

261-282_Giorgetti_F11.indd 268

11/22/2011 5:31:29 PM

The International Tribunal for Rwanda

269

The Tribunal may sentence the accused to incarceration for a term of either
life or years for each count, taking into account aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, as well as “[t]he general practice regarding prison sentences
in the courts of Rwanda,”61 and it will also indicate whether distinct sentences shall be served separately or concurrently.62 Sentences shall be served
in Rwanda or any other “State designated by the Tribunal from a list” of
States willing to accept convicts from the ICTR.63 Orders of restitution and
victim compensation may also be issued.64 Finally, within thirty days of judgment, either party may file a notice of appeal.65

F. Completion Strategy and Rule 11bis
In 2000, the ICTY proposed a completion strategy, whereby it would finish all pending investigations and issue any other indictments by December 2004, complete all trials by December 2008, and finish all appeals by
December 2010.66 The Security Council approved the plan and encouraged
the ICTR to develop one based on similar principles. The ICTR’s President
(and Judge) Eric Mose, who prepared the strategy, submitted it to the Security Council in 2003,67 and the Security Council officially adopted the strategy
by Resolution 1534 on March 26, 2004.68 The Council urged the Tribunal to
concentrate its indictments on the highest-level defendants and to transfer
lower-level perpetrators to national jurisdictions pursuant to Rule 11bis of
the Tribunal’s rules of procedure.69
Under Rule 11bis, the Prosecutor may refer a case to any State with a basis
to exercise jurisdiction (including universal jurisdiction) provided only that
the Tribunal can “satisfy itself that the accused will receive a fair trial” and
that the death penalty will not be imposed.70 The ICTR added this transfer
process to the RPE as one way to help clear its backlog of cases, which, it
seems clear, will not be completed by 2013, the date by which the ICTR is

61
62
63
64
65
66

67
68
69
70

Id. Rule 101.
Id. Rule 101(C).
Id. Rule 103(A).
Id. Rules 105–06.
Id. 107; see generally id. Pt. VII.
C. Aptel, “Closing the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Completion Strategy and Residual Issues,” 14 New Eng. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 169 (2008), p. 171.
Id.
S.C. Res. 1534, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004).
Id. ¶ 5.
RPE Rule 11bis.
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supposed to wrap up its work. When the Prosecutor requests a transfer, the
Tribunal holds a hearing to decide whether the transfer is acceptable. It considers, among other issues, (1) whether the defendant will receive a fair trial,
(2) the general competence of the proposed national jurisdiction’s judiciary,
including “whether it has a legal framework which criminalizes the alleged
conduct of the accused and provides an adequate penalty structure,”71 (3) the
rights of the defendant, including the presumption of innocence, the right to
a speedy trial, the right to counsel, and the existence vel non of an adequate
witness and victim protection program, and (4) that the death penalty will
not be imposed.72
Rwanda has tried to align its national court system with these requirements, including by passing a “transfer law” to create extra guarantees and
procedures applying only to the ICTR-transferred cases.73 Before 2007, however, the ICTR would not transfer cases to Rwanda’s national judicial system
because Rwanda retained the option of capital punishment. After Rwanda
abolished the death penalty in July 2007, several transfer requests were
immediately submitted, but the ICTR held that the possibility of prolonged
life imprisonment in isolation, too, should preclude a transfer.74 Concerns
have also been raised about insufficient witness protection – despite the existence of such a program.75 Transfers have, however, been approved to the
court systems of France and the Netherlands.76
Still, it seems clear at the date of this writing that the completion targets
remain unrealistic. The Security Council has authorized successive extensions. According to the ICTR’s latest report on its completion strategy to the
Security Council, all but one trial-level case would be completed by the end
of 2011 and all appeals by 2013. But the President of the ICTR, Judge Dennis

71

72

73

74
75
76

Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00–55B-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecution’s
Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis, ¶ 4 (Dec. 4, 2008).
Jesse Melman, “The Possibility of Transfer(?): A Comprehensive Approach to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Rule 11bis to Permit Transfer to Rwandan Domestic
Courts,” 79 Fordham L. Rev. 1271 (2010), pp. 1290–92.
Law No. 11/2007 of Mar. 16, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Mar. 19,
2007.
Hategekimana, op. cit., ¶¶ 31–38.
Id. ¶¶ 26–30.
Prosecutor v. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR-2005-87-I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s
Request for the Referral of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka’s Indictment to France (Nov. 20, 2007);
Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta, Case No. ICTR-2005-85-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for
Referral of Laurent Bucyibaruta’s Indictment to France (Nov. 20, 2007); Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-2005-86-11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of the
Indictment to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, PP 9–12 (Apr. 13, 2007).
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Byron, has warned that “depending upon the staffing situation . . . we cannot
exclude further delays in judgment delivery.”77

G. Significant Case Law
As noted, the ICTR decided very early on to focus on the high-level orchestrators of the genocide rather than rank-and-file perpetrators. This tendency
became even more pronounced in recent years, given pressure from the
Security Council to wind up the ICTR’s work and consequent encouragement to focus only on high-level cases, while transferring the others to competent national courts.78 In part for that reason, much of its case law deals
with important issues of first impression. The following brief survey can only
begin to scratch the surface.
1. Akayesu79
Jean-Paul Akayesu served as the bourgmestre of the Taba commune from
April 1993 through June 1994. In that capacity, he controlled the police and
bore responsibility for executing the commune’s laws, subject to the prefect’s
supervisory authority.80 The Akayesu decision is significant for at least three
reasons. First, it marked the ICTR’s first conviction for genocide. Second, it
resolved for the ICTR, albeit controversially, one of the most puzzling legal
issues in the definition of genocide: whether victims constitute a distinct ethnic group (or other protected, enumerated group) only if they constitute,
in some sense, an objectively existing ethnic group or, in contrast, if it suffices that the persecutor subjectively perceives the victims as members of a
particular ethnic group. Third, in Akayesu, the ICTR recognized for the first
time that rape could be a modality, or component, of genocide, as well as a
crime against humanity. The first of these points requires little elaboration,
except to note that Akayesu also marked the first conviction for genocide by
any international tribunal, not just the ICTR, since World War II.

77

78
79
80

Judge Dennis Byron, Address to the United Nations Security Council: Report on the Completion Strategy of the ICTR, (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.unictr.org/ (last visited Mar. 22,
2011).
S.C. Res. 1534, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 ¶¶ 5–6 (Mar. 26, 2004).
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sep. 2, 1998).
Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
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a. Subjective Standard
The ICTR Statute, which reproduces the definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention verbatim,81 defines the crime as any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members in a group;
(b) Causing serious bodily harm or mental harm to members in a group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and]
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”
The ICTR convicted Akayesu of genocide and crimes against humanity,
including, in particular, acts of extermination, murder, torture, and rape.82
During the genocide, more than 2000 Tutsis in Taba were killed by the Hutu
génocidaires. Akayesu did nothing to prevent the killings;83 to the contrary,
he facilitated and encouraged them.
At first blush, he would seem clearly to be guilty of genocide under the
ICTR Statute. Yet the crime’s definition presupposes a unique mental state:
the specific intent, or dolus specialis, to destroy one of the enumerated protected groups as such.84 The ICTR defined an “ethnic group” in the judgment as “a group whose members share a common language or culture.”85
By the application of that definition, the Tutsi, the relevant ethnic group
in the Rwandan genocide, and the Hutu, the génocidaires, do not belong to
distinct ethnic groups.86 They share the same language, Kinyarwanda, and
general cultural traditions. In fact, the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi
had originally been based on family lineage, not ethnicity, and individuals
could be reclassified based on their socioeconomic status or marriage.87
The Trial Chamber, however, decided that it would be appropriate to look
to the Genocide Convention’s travaux préparatoires (drafting history) and,
purportedly on this basis, concluded that “any group, similar to the four
[enumerated] groups in terms of its stability and permanence, should also be
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Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Art. 2, Dec. 9,
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included [in the definition of genocide].”88 It reasoned that, by 1994, Rwandans deemed the Tutsi a distinct “ethnic” group, as reflected, for example,
in the official classifications on their identity cards. Witnesses also readily
identified themselves before the Tribunal as being a member of one or the
other ethnic group. The Tutsis therefore constituted a “stable and permanent
group,” all of which, according to the Trial Chamber, fall within the scope of
the definition of genocide.89 As Payam Akhavan, among others, subsequently
pointed out, this reasoning is deeply problematic, in part because “[t]there is
no support whatsoever for the proposition that the drafters of the Convention intended anything but an exhaustive listing of the protected groups.”90
Later cases thus took slightly different, and less problematic, approaches.
In Prosecutor v. Kayishema,91 the Trial Chamber fit the Tutsis into the ethnic group category by defining “ethnic group” very broadly, viz., as a group
“whose members share a common language and culture; or, a group which
distinguishes itself, as such (self identification); or, a group identified as such
by others, including perpetrators of the crimes (identification by others).”92
In Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, the Trial Chamber took yet another approach,
stressing that the identity of the enumerated groups depended, in part, on
context and should be construed, “in essence, [as] a subjective rather than
an objective concept. The victim is perceived by the perpetrator of genocide
as belonging to a group slated for destruction. In some instances, the victim
may perceive himself/herself as belonging to the said group.”93 But consistent with the travaux, the Rutaganda court excluded political and economic
groups from the ambit of the Genocide Convention’s definition. It described
the latter as “ ‘mobile groups’ which one joins though individual, political
commitment,” affirming the general conclusion that ethnic groups should
be relatively stable and permanent.94 While the ICTR ultimately rejected the
sheer breadth of the Akayesu Trial Chamber’s standard, it retained the fundamental principle that the self- or other-identification of an ethnic group
may suffice to satisfy Article 2’s requirement in this regard – even if anthropologists, for example, would not describe two groups as distinct ethnic
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groups in a purely scientific, objective sense (as is true in the case of the
Hutu and Tutsi).
b. Rape as a Modality of Genocide
Akayesu also merits special attention because it marked the first conviction
for rape as a crime against humanity and the first case in which the ICTR
conceptualized rape as a potential component or modality of genocide.95
While rape is a crime against humanity under the ICTR Statute,96 classifying it as a modality of genocide remains significant, both expressively and
because it may be more likely to trigger early intervention on the part of
other States in future circumstances of mass atrocity.97 The Trial Chamber
found, in particular, that “rape and sexual violence” could be methods of
inflicting “serious bodily and mental harm” within the meaning of Article 2
of the Genocide Convention (and the ICTR Statute) and therefore could
“constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as long as they were
committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such.”98
Reaching this conclusion required the Trial Chamber first to define rape,
for until then, it had not been defined for purposes of international criminal
law. Finding that the crime “cannot be captured in a mechanical description
of objects and body parts,” the Chamber instead analogized rape roughly to
the definition of torture in the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,99 which similarly “does not catalogue specific acts in its definition of torture, focusing
rather on the conceptual frame work of State sanctioned violence.”100 It then
defined rape broadly as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed
on a person under circumstances which are coercive.”101 To be a modality of
perpetrating crimes against humanity, of course, it must also be (1) part of a
widespread or systematic attack; (2) on a civilian population; (3) on certain
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catalogued discriminatory grounds, namely: national, ethnic, political, racial,
or religious grounds.”102 The ICTR also noted that rape “in fact constitutes
torture when inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”103
The definition’s use of general terms like “physical invasion” and its
acknowledgement that sexual assaults do not require direct physical force
make it relatively progressive.104 Indeed, both the ICTY and the ICC elected
to define rape more narrowly.105 But the Akayesu definition may well have
influenced national and international standards for prosecuting sexual
violence. It has been cited by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), as well as in the U.S. Joint Services Law
of War Manual.106
Press coverage of the ICTR credited the recognition of rape as the highest level of crime to the pressure that human rights and women’s organizations placed on the Prosecutor. A 1998 New York Times article quoted
human rights expert Felice Gaer as saying that the “Tribunals were literally
forced to pay attention to a series of petitions and pressures from women’s
organizations demanding that rape be recognized.”107 The Akayesu decision
noted the “interest shown” by NGOs as “indicative of public concern over
the historical exclusion of rape and other forms of sexual violence from the
investigation and prosecution of war crimes.”108
2. Kayishema & Ruzindana109
Because the ICTR, unlike the ICTY, dealt exclusively with the law of armed
conflict, or international humanitarian law (IHL), in an internal conflict,
the international war crimes jurisprudence developed by the ICTY has
not always, or even often, answered some of the same difficult questions
of first impression regarding IHL that the ICTR has faced. In Prosecutor v.
Kayishema, the Trial Chamber established the background or circumstantial
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elements – sometimes referred to as the chapeau, which must be established
in addition to whatever actus reus and mens rea may be required – that
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish a violation
of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 or of provisions
of Additional Protocol II: first, the existence of an armed conflict “not of an
international character” at the time of the violation; second, a “link between
the accused and the armed forces” of one party to the relevant conflict; third,
that the crimes were committed ratione personae and ratione loci, that is,
over victims qualifying as civilians or the civilian population relative to the
relevant armed conflict and within the place (here, Rwanda) in which the
conflict occurs; and fourth, a nexus between the crime and the conflict.110
a. Non-International Armed Conflict
The ICTR defined a non-international armed conflict broadly as one “between
[a High Contracting Party’s] armed forces and dissident armed forces or
other organised armed groups,”111 in contradistinction to “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of
violence and other acts of a similar nature,” which fall below the “minimum
threshold.”112
It should be noted in this regard that although it makes little difference in
the case of the genocide in Rwanda, it is not at all clear that the threshold
for Common Article 3’s application is identical to that established by Additional Protocol II; most international lawyers agree that the former’s scope
exceeds the latter’s. For although Additional Protocol II indeed says that it
“develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions,”113
as the ICTR noted in Kayishema & Ruzindana,114 Common Article 3’s text
requires only an “armed conflict not of an international character occurring
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,” while Additional
Protocol II adds that the conflict must be “between [the High Contracting
Party’s] armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part
of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.”115 The latter criterion does
not qualify Common Article 3, which, as the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately
held, bringing its jurisprudence into line with the prevailing interpretation
110
111
112
113
114
115

Kayishema & Ruzindana, op. cit., ¶ 169.
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of Common Article 3 as expressed by, among others, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “[t]he term ‘conflict not of an international
character’ is used here in contradistinction to a conflict between nations’ ” –
not, as the United States had argued in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, exclusively to
civil wars.116
b. Link Between the Accused and the Armed Forces
The ICTR further concluded that if the defendants do not belong to the armed
forces of one of the parties to the conflict, the Prosecutor must at a minimum
establish “a link between them and the armed forces.”117 Consequently, quoting Akayesu, the Tribunal said that Additional Protocol II extends to “individuals who were legitimately mandated and expected as public officials or
agents or persons otherwise holding public authority or de facto representing
the Government to support or fulfil the war efforts.”118 The upshot is that
civilians, and not only members of an armed force, may be liable for violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II.119
c. Ratione Personae and Ratione Loci
The Tribunal noted that in addition to personal jurisdiction over the defendants, Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II raise the question of
the necessary status of the victims. Here, the Trial Chamber concluded that,
“for the purpose of protection of victims of armed conflict,” and consistent
with the ICRC’s views, the words “civilian” and “civilian population” in these
treaties must be defined in the negative, that is, as all persons “who are not
members of the armed forces.”120 In a similar vein, while neither Common
Article 3 nor Additional Protocol II contains a clear provision on “applicability ratione loci,” the language of Common Article 3 referring to the enumerated acts in that provision being prohibited “at any time and in any place
whatsoever”121 makes clear that the relevant war crimes need not take place
in “the actual theatre of operations.”122
d. Nexus Requirement
Finally, the Tribunal held that a nexus must be established between the
crimes and the relevant armed conflict. To prove a nexus, there must be a
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“direct link” between the offenses and the conflict.123 Establishing the requisite nexus requires evidence, a factual showing, rather than the application
of an abstract test, and therefore “it is for the Trial Chamber, on a case-bycase basis, to adjudge on the facts submitted as to whether a nexus existed.”124
In Kayishema & Ruzindana, the allegations were found to show “only that
the armed conflict had been used as a pretext to unleash an official policy of
genocide” but not to constitute evidence of a “direct link between the alleged
crimes and the armed conflict.”125
In the context of the Rwandan genocide, the Prosecution has not found
this standard readily met in all cases. It failed, for example, to establish a
nexus in Akayesu: providing some support to government forces in Taba
did not suffice to render Akayesu’s crimes sufficiently related to the civil
war.126 In the 2003 appeal of Georges Rutaganda, the Tribunal clarified that
the focus of the nexus analysis must be on the specific actions of the accused,
not the abstract link between the genocide and the armed conflict overall.127
Consequently, the Trial Chamber stressed that while “[g]enocide against the
Tutsis and the conflict between the RAF and the RPF are undeniably linked,
the Prosecutor cannot merely rely on a finding of genocide and consider that,
as such, serious violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II
are thereby automatically established.”128 The Appeals Chamber, however,
found a sufficient link between Rutaganda’s actions and the armed conflict in
Rwanda. “Given the activities of the Interahamwe and the position of authority held by Rutaganda, its second vice president, a close link was established
between his culpable acts and the armed conflict.”129 The Tribunal therefore
reversed the Trial Chamber on this point, marking the first conviction for
war crimes at the ICTR.130

123

124
125
126
127

128

129

130

Id. ¶ 185. Accord Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, ¶ 193 (Nov. 16,
1998); Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 533 (May 7, 1997).
Kayishema & Ruzindana, op. cit., ¶ 188.
Id. ¶ 603.
Akayesu, op. cit., ¶¶ 642–43.
Jamie Williamson, “The Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
on War Crimes,” 12 New Eng. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 51 (2005), p. 64.
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3-T, Judgment & Sentence, ¶ 443 (Dec. 6,
1999).
Williamson, “The Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on
War Crimes,” op. cit., p. 64 (2005).
Id., p. 65.

261-282_Giorgetti_F11.indd 278

11/22/2011 5:31:29 PM

The International Tribunal for Rwanda

279

3. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze131
No overview of the ICTR’s significant case law, however brief, would be
complete without some remarks on Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza
& Ngeze, also known as The Media Case. It involved three media executives,
Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze, whose
involvement with print and broadcast media led to their convictions for,
inter alia, direct and public incitement to genocide.132 The Trial Chamber
broke new legal ground in classifying mass hate speech as itself genocidal.133
The hate speech at issue arose from the defendants’ connection to two principal media: Kangura, a widely read newspaper, which had, before and during
the genocide, portrayed the Tutsi as “hypocrites, thieves, and killers” and
Tutsi women as over-sexualized;134 and Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), or “radio machete” as some referred to it, for the broadcasts
not only promoted hatred of the Tutsi, but encouraged listeners to injure and
kill them – going so far as to direct the killing of particular people.135
All three defendants were convicted by the Trial Chamber under Article
6(1) of the ICTR Statute because they employed media as, in effect, a weapon –
and with an intent to kill.136 The defendants also instilled hatred in the population, coordinated their efforts with one another, and persecuted Tutsi.137
The Trial Chamber, perhaps most significantly as a precedential matter, held
members of the media responsible, not only for the content of what they
published, but for its consequences: “Successful incitement to genocide being
genocide, the purveyors of genocidal journalism and hate radio were convicted of deploying speech as a lethal weapon, as guilty of genocide as if they
had personally wielded the machetes.”138
The Appeals Chamber softened some of the more progressive statements of the Trial Chamber.139 In particular, while the Trial Chamber had
allowed expression occurring before the genocide to be taken into account as

131

132
133
134
135
136
137

138
139

Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A (Nov. 27, 2007)
(hereinafter Nahimana, et al., AC) Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case
No. ICTR-99-52-A (Dec. 3, 2003) (hereinafter Nahima, et al. TC).
Nahimana et al. AC, op. cit., ¶ 6.
See Nahimana et al. TC, op. cit., ¶¶ 965–69, 974–75, 977A.
Id. ¶ 172.
Id. ¶¶ 487–88.
Id. ¶¶ 974, 975, 977A.
Catherine MacKinnon, “Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze,” 98 Am. J. Int’l
L. 325 (2004) p. 328.
Id., pp. 328–29.
See generally David J. Bederman, “Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze,” 103
Am. J. Int’l L. 97 (2004).

261-282_Giorgetti_F11.indd 279

11/22/2011 5:31:29 PM

280

Robert D. Sloane

continuing conduct if it caused criminal acts that fell within the Tribunal’s
temporal jurisdiction, the Appeals Chamber found the connection “tenuous” and reasoned that the longer the interval between the expression and
the result, the more difficult it becomes to infer causation.140 In a similar
vein, the Appeals Chamber found that recycled media, e.g., newspapers published earlier or broadcasts in prior years that were read or heard later and
arguably incited genocide, could, at most, constitute indirect incitement to
genocide.141
This view led the Appeals Chamber to set aside the most serious charges
against Barayagwiza, a lawyer and cofounder of the RTLM – for, according
to the Chamber, he did not exercise sufficient control over broadcasts during the actual weeks of the genocide. In contrast, the Appeals Chamber had
no difficulty sustaining his conviction for direct words and actions at the
time insofar as they incited genocide.142 The Appeals Chamber also clarified
that while hate speech is not, ipso facto, persecution, the encouragement of
or calls for violence, combined with hate speech by the RTLM, were serious
enough to constitute a crime against humanity and also could be characterized as acts of persecution as well as incitement of others to persecute.143
4. Baglishema144
Prosecutor v. Baglishema bears mentioning because it marked the ICTR’s first
acquittal, which a unanimous Appeals Chamber sustained. Like Akayesu,
Baglishema had been a local official at the time of the genocide. The Prosecutor indicted him on a theory of command responsibility for his alleged
failure to “prevent, suppress, or punish crimes committed by subordinates.”145
Even though the weight of the evidence against Bagilishema arguably could
be equated roughly with the evidence in the case against Kayishema,146 the
Trial Chamber found it insufficient to sustain a conviction.147 The Rwandan
government said that it was shocked by the acquittal of such a high-level
defendant.148 Carla Del Ponte, the ICTR’s Prosecutor at the time, replied that
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while the evidence had been sound and substantial, it had been poorly presented, and she later declined to renew the contract of the senior trial attorney in charge of the case.149 Following his release, several European States
refused to grant him asylum, although France ultimately accepted him into
its territory.150

H. Conclusion
The ICTR has come under heavy criticism from multiple fronts. Its budget,
arguably, is far out of proportion to the progress made by the Tribunal over
(at the time of this writing) a period of nearly seventeen years.151 Many see
it as a “fig leaf ” covering the international community’s shameful failure to
intervene at the time of the genocide. And still others criticize the Court’s
imposition of international due process and human rights standards on the
people of Rwanda, who arguably should be the ones to determine the modality of transitional justice for a tragedy of such monumental proportions that
took place against them in their own country.
On the other hand, as this brief introduction suggests, the ICTR has established a number of critical precedents in the realm of international criminal
law, both substantive and procedural, and however imperfectly, has to some
extent vindicated the idea that there should be no amnesty for the perpetrators of genocide.
As of March 9, 2011:
• the trials of fifty-two defendants have been completed, eight of whom were
acquitted;
• the trials of twenty-one defendants continue;
• ten cases are on appeal;
• one defendant, Jean Bosco Uwinkindi, is still awaiting trial;
• two cases have been transferred to France for trial; and
• ten of the accused are still at large.152
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Above all, perhaps, together with the ICTY, the ICTR galvanized support
for the creation of the permanent International Criminal Court. Whether
the latter’s aspirations, as set forth in the Preamble to the Rome Statute, e.g.,
“to put an end to impunity” and to ensure “that the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole . . . not go unpunished,”153
will be realized remains to be seen.
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